Tensions build ahead of critical election in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe will hold its unified elections on 23 August when voters will cast ballots for the president, the legislature, and local councils. Zimbabwean elections have historically been marked by a fraught political environment with frequent outbreaks of violence and unrest. The 23 August poll is expected to be no different. Already, there have been multiple reports of opposition members and supporters being targeted by security services and individuals affiliated with the ruling Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).

Underpinning these tensions is the expectation that the upcoming election will be closely contested, especially the presidential race. According to polling by pan-African research firm Afrobarometer in conjunction with independent Zimbabwean consultancy, the Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI), in April and May, 35% of eligible voters intend to vote for President Emmerson Mnangagwa while 27% plan to cast their ballot for Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) leader Nelson Chamisa. However, significantly, 27% of respondents refused to indicate their voting intention. This, combined with the fact that the same survey found that 65% believe Zimbabwe is headed in the wrong direction, suggests that Chamisa and the CCC have a strong chance of winning, assuming a free and fair election is held. This was underscored by a recent survey in June by market research firm, Elite Africa Research, which found that in a fair race, Chamisa would win the presidency by around 8 percentage points.

However, such a legitimate election is unlikely. ZANU-PF has extensive control over state institutions, especially the security services, but also, to some degree, over the judiciary and the electoral authorities. These ostensibly independent state institutions rarely rule against ZANU-PF and the government if they can avoid it.

However, despite ZANU-PF’s entrenched power, the ruling party will likely refrain from overtly influencing the vote. The election will be monitored by several international missions, most notably from the South African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU). The EU mission is particularly significant as its findings will be closely scrutinised by Zimbabwe’s creditors and Western governments who have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in the past. These vested interests have made it clear to Mnangagwa that his efforts to secure debt and sanction relief will only be considered if Zimbabwe stages a free and fair election. As such, ZANU-PF is unlikely to commit any obvious irregularities regarding the casting and counting of votes themselves.

Instead, the ruling party will fall back to its oft-used strategy of suppressing opposition support. This is illustrated by the intensifying intimidation campaign targeting opposition leaders and supporters in Zimbabwe. Attacks targeting CCC candidates and supporters have been reported across the country, particularly in the rural areas on which ZANU-PF is dependent to retain its parliamentary majority and where there is less exposure to foreign media coverage.

In order to overcome ZANU-PF’s voter suppression and intimidation efforts as well as suspected bias within the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission (ZEC), Chamisa and the CCC will need to secure a wide enough margin of victory to negate these efforts. However, the CCC does not currently appear to be on track to do so, partly due to errors of its own making.

The CCC opted against holding conventional party primary elections this year and instead followed an untested community-centric candidate selection process. However, instead of achieving the stated aim of increased transparency, the process was opaque and confusing. In addition, the CCC only revealed its candidate list on 19 June, the day before candidate nomination papers were due. This left insufficient time to address internal disputes or placate aggrieved unsuccessful candidates. This lack of time, combined with the confusion of the CCC’s process, resulted in the party having multiple candidates registered in some constituencies. Such a scenario risks dividing the opposition vote and handing victory to ZANU-PF even in some opposition strongholds. The CCC’s chaotic start to the election period will undermine its efforts to win control of the legislature. As such, ZANU-PF is forecast to retain control of Zimbabwe’s parliament regardless of the outcome of the presidential election.

The race for the presidency is expected to be closely fought and there is a strong possibility that it will be forced to go to a second-round run-off election between Chamisa and Mnangagwa. Such an event will take place on 2 October if necessary. If a run-off election is required the risk of political violence and unrest will be dramatically heightened. Such a development would be reminiscent of the 2008 election in which the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) party received the most votes in the first round but ended up withdrawing from the race ahead of the second round in response to escalating violence targeting his supporters and indications of electoral fraud to ensure then-president Robert Mugabe’s re-election.

Chamisa is unlikely to bow out of any second-round election and ZANU-PF will not willingly allow itself to lose power in Zimbabwe. As such, if a second round election is needed the CCC will likely face intensifying intimidation and violence. In such an event, Mnangagwa will also likely forego the possibility of securing his desired debt and sanctions relief and will instead focus on retaining power regardless of the cost.

In the meantime, both ZANU-PF and the CCC will continue focusing on their respective electoral campaigns. Initial signs indicate that the CCC is successfully managing to draw supporters and mobilise crowds despite the threat of state-sponsored intimidation. This is a promising sign for Chamisa and his party. It is also possible that Zimbabwe’s continued economic woes and the virtual collapse of the currency over the past six months have helped blunt the fear of ZANU-PF and fuelled public frustration to the extent that it the opposition now has the best chance of winning an election since 2008.

(ERA)